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HOW DOES EPILEPSY AFFECT THE VALIDITY
OF MARRIAGES
Doctor William G. Lennox (a leading medical authority on epilepsy)
in his article on this disease' classifies epilepsy into two groups: first, that
in which an inborn hereditary tendency seems the predominant, though
not the exclusive factor. The seizures characteristic of this group are
called genetic (idiopathic) seizures, and in this form the disease may be
called true epilepsy. In the second group, some post conceptual environmental condition seems the predominant, though not the exclusive factor.
In this group the seizures are called acquired (symptomatic) seizures.2 Only
the idiopathic type of epilepsy is transmissible to offspring. The law
should not be concerned with symptomatic epilepsy, but in practice few
courts make a distinction between the two.
Doctor Lennox has pointed out that true epilepsy, or so-called idiopathic epilepsy, usually begins to be manifested around the pubescent
period and is generally progressive, while no physical basis for its presence
is discoverable. It is defined as a group of symptoms appearing in connection with the repeated occurrence of convulsive seizures. The convulsive attack is not the essential factor in epilepsy. The main factor is
the episodic disturbances of the central nervous system.
From the legal point of view, the court in Busch v. Grltber3 defined
epilepsy as a chronic disease of the nervous system attended by brain
deterioration, which is progressive, is congenital, and likely to be transmitted by marriage and childbearing, and is considered incurable. Proof
of epilepsy is not proof of insanity, except that one is considered temporarily insane during the course of an epileptic seizure. Epilepsy may
cause insanity, but does not constitute it, and the two should not be confounded. 4 In Gould v. GoIld&the court said that it is a matter of common
knowledge, of which courts will take judicial notice, that epilepsy is a
disease of a serious character, tending to weaken mental force, and often
descending from parent to child, or entailing upon the offspring of the
sufferer some other grave form of nervous malady.
The subject of epilepsy has by no means gone unnoticed by legislatures.
As early as 1895, Conneticut. enacted a statute G which as revised in 1902
provided as follows:
Every man and woman, either of whom is epileptic, imbecile, or
feeble-minded, who shall intermarry, or live together as husband
and wife, when the woman is under forty-five years of age, shall
be imprisoned not more than three years....
In 1905 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut upheld the constitu1.
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tionality of this statute in the case of Gould v. Gould.7 In this case the
parties were married in 1899. Several years later the plaintiff learned of
this statute, left the defendant, and brought this suit for a decree of annulment or a divorce. One of the grounds for divorce in Connecticut was
"fraudulent contract." The Connecticut court held that a marriage of this
type, in violation of the statute, was voidable, not void. The court
reached this result by concluding that the Legislature by merely prescribing
a criminal penalty intended to leave the effect of a marriage contracted
in violation of the Act of 1895 to be determined by the general principles
of the common law, and that at common law a marriage brought about by
the fraud of one of the parties was voidable. The case was remanded for
trial, as a divorce case, upon the issue of fraud.
Since 1895 several states have enacted similar statutes, among them
being Kansas, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Utah, Washington, and
Wisconsin.S The Minnesota statute is more inclusive than that of Connecticut. It provides that:
No marriage shall be contracted . . . between persons either one

of whom is epileptic, imbecile, feebleminded, or insane. ... .'
This places an absolute restriction upon the marriage ceremony. In the
Minnesota case of Behsman v. Behsmnant ° the husband sought to annul a
marriage on the ground that unknown to him his wife was an epileptic at
the time of the marriage. The court refused the annulment because
(according to the court's view) the failure of the wife to reveal that she
was afflicted with epilepsy was innocent and not fraudulent. However,
the court indicated by way of dictum that if fraud or concealment had
been shown, a decree of annulment would have been granted, based on the
Minnesota statute which provided that no epileptic shall marry.
The Wisconsin court took a somewhat different view of this Minnesota
statute in the case of Kitzman v. Kitzinan. 1 Here the plaintiff and defendant were refused a marriage license in Wisconsin and they went to
Minnesota, obtained a license, were married before a justice of the peace,
and received a marriage certificate from such justice in the proper form.
They returned to Wisconsin and lived. The defendant was afflicted with
epilepsy when married. Several months later the wife commenced the
action gainst her husband and his guardian, asking that the marriage
ceremony be declared a valid marriage, and that the proceedings pending
to commit the defendant to the county insane asylum be stayed. The court
held the marriage ceremony voidable in Minnesota, as being against the
prohibition of the Minnesota statute, and contrary to the public policy
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.

Note 5 supra.
Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, 1949) §§ 23-120 to 123; N.H. Rev. Lews (1942) c. 338,
§ 10, Amend. N.H. Laws (1949), c. 121; N.D. Rev. Code §§ 14-0307, 14-0317(3)
(1943) ; Utah Code Ann. § 40-1-2 (1) (1943) ; Rem. Rev. Stat. § 8439 (Wash. 1931)
Wis. Stats. § 245.03 (1951).
M.S.A. 517.03.
144 Minn. 95, 174 N.W. 611 (1919).
167 Wis. 308, 166 N.. 789 (1918).

WYOMING

LAW JOURNAL

of Wisconsin as well. Accordingly, the Wisconsin court annulled the
marriage, but without any showing of fraud.
The Kitzman opinion reasoned that since Minnesota had provided by
Sec. 7106, Minn. Stats. 1913 that marriages prohibited by law on account
of consanguinity, or because either party had a former spouse living, if
solemnized within Minnesota should be absolutely void without any legal
proceedings, then all other marriages contracted contrary to other statutory
prohibitions than those two so specified are voidable only, and valid until
dissolved by judicial decree.' 2 Therefore, under the two general types of
statutes, Connecticut and Minnesota, we may say that a marriage in violation of either type of statute is voidable, but not void. The Minnesota
court required proof of fraud, as (lid the Connecticut court. But Wisconsin,

interpreting the Minnesota statute, held that a showing of fraud is unnecessary under such a statute as existed in Minnesota.
In the absence of a statute prohibiting marriage between persons
either of whom is epileptic, the courts have generally held that if the
afflicted person conceals the fact of epilepsy, a fraud results which "goes
to the essentials" of the marriage relationship. Historically, the doctrine
began with holding that concealment of a venereal disease prior to marriage constitutes fraud of such a character that it affects the essence of the
marriage. Sobel v. Sobel' 3 is an example of a decision which extended the
rule for annulment of marriage in the case of fraudulent concealment to
other than venereal diseases. This rule was held to include epilepsy in
the case Busch v. Gruber.'4 There the defendant was suffering from
epilepsy prior to the marriage. He concealed this fact from his prospective
wife and affiriatively represented to her that he was in good health.
Shortly after the marriage he had an epileptic fit, and after discovery,
his wife, the paintiff, left him. The court held that the wife was entitled
to an annulment. In this case the defendant not only suppressed the
truth about his condition prior to the marriage, but falsely represented
that he was in good health. (This is apparently the type of fraud which
the Minnesota court would require.)
In New York there were two earlier decisions on the subject.' 5 The
court dismissed the complaint in the Elser case saying that there was no
evidence of fraud. One year later, in the case of McGill v. McGill,16 the
court found that the plaintiff voluntarily cohabited with defendant as his
wife, with full knowledge of the facts constituting the alleged fraud upon
him. It was held that such voluntary cohabitation precluded any annulment of the marriage by reason of the alleged fraud based on concealment
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of epilepsy. The holding in the Appellate Division did not overrule or
modify the Supreme Court's decision 17 in the same case, that epilepsy is
sufficient ground for annuling a marriage for fraud.
In the case of Lee v. Lee's the court held that epilepsy is not of itself
ground for annulment of marriage, but if so severe as to prevent a normal
marital life, then the court will grant a decree of annulment providing
that knowledge of the condition was purposely concealed before the marriage and that the parties did not cohabit after the discovery of the condition. This holding was dictum, since the proceeding was an application
for support money, filed in the Domestic Relations Court which in New
York had no jurisdiction to annul a marriage.
In the case of Richardson v. Richardson' 9 the problem was )resented
for the first time in Massachusetts. In this case the wife knew she was
afflicted with epilepsy prior to her marriage. She had told her prospective husband that when she overworked she had fainting spells, which were
not serious. Several weeks after the marriage the husband discovered her
true condition and petitioned for an annulment. In denying the petition,
the court held that concealment of epilepsy prior to the marriage was not
a ground for annulment, evidently because it did not go to "the essentials"
of marriage. Here the court refused to extend the rule for annulment of
marriage in the case of fraudulent concealment to other than venereal
diseases, the court saying:
We are not aware of any case in this commonwealth where the
fraudulent concealment of a disease other than venereal has been
considered on the question under consideration except Cummington v. Belchertown. It was held that concealment of the fact that the
woman had been insane previous to her marriage, she being sane
at the time of the marriage, did not constitute such fraud as
entitled her husband to have the marriage dissolved even though
subsequently she became incurably insane.
In Wyoming no statute exists involving epilepsy as a ground for either
divorce or annulment of marriage, nor is there any case authority.
Doctor Lennox points out that eugenics is the principal prophylaxis
against genetic epilepsy. To reduce epilepsy in succeeding generations,
eugenics would need to be applied not only to persons subject to genetic
seizures, but also to persons with other hereditary cerebral diseases, especially
20
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Some courts hold that the marriage in violation of a statute is voidable
even in the absence of fraud or concealment.
There seems to be ample authority to the effect that an annulment
will be granted on proof of fraudulent concealment of epilepsy. In Massachusetts, however, fraudulent concealment of epilepsy is not a ground for
an annulment.
RALPH
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EQUITABLE RELIEF IN LIBEL AND SLANDER
Ever since 1818 when the English decision by Lord Eldon in the case
1
of Gee v. Pritchard
propounded the feudalistic dictum that injunctions
can only be granted in cases involving property rights, the American courts
have had an extremely difficult time granting injunctive relief to those
who are suffering primarily only a loss to their names and reputations.
That the rule in Gee v. Pritchard2 was only dictum, and that the English
courts ceased to worry about it long ago,3 seems to make little impression
here. If our courts can find no property right involved in a case, they will
quite probably refuse injunctive relief. 4 This dictum of the English court
seems especially unfortunate when, after stating it, they then went on in

the case to find a property right in a personal letter written by the plaintiff to the defendant, and on this theory proceeded to grant an injunction
against the publication of the letter by the defendant. Many courts today
do not really insist on this property right to give equitable relief, but they
do follow the dictum to the extent of refusing relief in cases which show
no more than an injury to personality alone, as in libel and slander.
The dictum has become such strong authority that many times the
courts of this country have decided a case with the flat statement that it is
a well settled point of law that equity will not act to enjoin libel or slander
where no propery rights are involved in the issue. 5 Other courts have
refused the relief by deciding that they would be violating the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and the press and to a trial by jury. 6
This, of course, was the reasoning behind the dictum in the English case.
However, many of the courts today, realizing that the law remedy for
damages in cases of libel or slander is often so uncertain and impossible
as to be no remedy at all, have found a number of exceptions to the dis1.
2.
3.
4.

Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanst. 402, 36 Eng.Rep. 670 (1818).
Ibid.
Dixon v. Holden, L.R. 7 Eq. 488, 20 L.T. 357, 17 W.R. 482 (1868); Bonnard v.
Perryman, 2 Ch. 269 (1891).
Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 30 L.Ed. 165, 6 S.Ct. 1148 (1885); Covell v. Chadwick,
153 Mass. 263, 26 N.E. 856, 25 Am.St.Rep. 65 (1890); Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige
(N.Y.) 24, 34 Am.Dec. 368 (1839); Kwass v. Kersey ...
V.Va .........81 S.E.2d

237 (1954).
5.

Ibid.

6.

Brandreth v. Lance, supra note 4; Kwass v. Kersey, supra note 4.

